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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,

Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
8456

MILDA HOPKINS ASHDOWN,

Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT ·OF THE CASE
Milda Hopkins Ashdown, at Cedar City, Iron County,
Utah, on the 5th day of July A. D., 1955, murdered her
husband, Ray Ashdown, by administering to him strychnine
poison; was ·charged with murder in the first degre~ and
found ·guilty by a jury of her peers who recommended life
imprisonment as punishment and not the death sentence.
The Fifth Judicial District Court, Honorable Will L.
Hoyt, Judge, imposed sentence in accordance with the
verdict and the recommendation of the jury..
Through counsel, defendant prosecutes this appeal.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
We shall adopt the appellant's Statement of the Facts
but for the purpose of continuity in the presentation of
respondent's argument and authorities, the facts will be
further and more fully developed under the points hereinafter set forth.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE LAW AND THE EVIDENCE SUPPORT
THE VERDICT.
POINT II
THERE WAS NO COERCION, DURESS OR
PROMISE OF IMMUNITY MADE TO THE
DEFENDANT NOR WAS THERE A VIOLATION OF ANY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF
THE DEFENDANT AND THE COURT WAS
CORRECT IN SO FINDING.
POINT III
THE DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS TO THE
OFFICERS PRIOR TO HER ARREST AND
PRIOR TO HER REQUEST FOR COUNSEL
WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE.
POINT IV
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE GIVING
OF INSTRUCTION NO. 6.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LAW AND THE EVIDENCE SUPPORT
THE VERDICT.
It is the appellant's contention that:"Aside from the oral admissions made by the
defendant during the questioning by the officers,
there was no other evidence in the record connecting
the defendant with the crime."
The State thinks otherwise.
Dr. R. G. Williams testified to the following conversation had with Ray Ashdown just before the said Ray Ashdown died:
"* * * And I said : 'Ray have you taken
anything poison?' And he said 'No.' I said : 'Have
you eaten anything spoiled?' He said 'No.' I said :
'Were you well this morning when you got up?' He
said : 'Yes.' I said : 'When did you get sick?' And
he said: 'A little while ago.' I said: 'Haven't you
drunk anything or eaten anything?' He said: 'I
had some lemonade about half hour ago.' "

*
*
*
*
*
"* * * He said: 'I had some lemon JUice
about a half hour ago.' And I said: 'How did it
taste, Ray?' And he started into another convulsion,
and he said, 'Doc, it tasted bitter'" (R. 23).
The defendant had told the witness Gloria Jean Barnhurst
that her husband hadn't felt well since his breakfast (R.
18).
We would contend that the defendant in fact knew
that her husband had taken, internally, strychnine; other-
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wise, why did she administer to him two or three glasse·s
of salt water in the hope that it would act as an emetic (R.
29). The State conclusively proved that the stomach of
Ray Ashdown and the contents thereof contained strychnine, (R. 47) of an "appreciable" amount (R. 54). Mrs.
Ashdown told Sheriff Nelson, freely and voluntarily on the
day of the murder and before the interrogation of which
defendant now complains, that she gave her husband a cup
of Iemond juice (R. 70) ; that was the aluminum cup with
a red ring around the top of it which was:

"* * * setting on the top of the rest of the
dishes turned upside down.
Tell us whether or not the dishes had been
washed, Mr. Nelson.
"A. I didn't think they had.
"Q.

In relation to this cup you spoke about,
had it been washed?
"A. Yes, the cup was clean" (R. 68).
"Q.

We would claim for this cup and its cleansed condition
something more than a mere coincidence; we would claim
that the washing of the cup, when done, in and of itself,
was. sufficient to cast a grave suspicion upon the defendant.
On July 9th, during the questioning of the defendant,
at the start thereof and before any confession, Mrs. Ashdown related the facts about the cup, saying:
And after that, sheriff, who spoke and
what was said?
"A. I believe that we asked her-I don't know
whether I asked her or someone else at that time, I
"Q.
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believe it was me though that asked her-if Ray
drank all of the lemon juice that was in the cup.
And what was the answer?
"A. She said no, he didn't drink it all. And
I asked her what became of what was left. And she
said that she threw the lemon juice out of the back
door?
"Q. Did she tell you what she did with the cup
after she threw the lemon juice out of the back
door?
"A. Yes. She said that she washed the cup
and set it on top of the dish pan.
"Q.

Did she tell you when in relation to the
death of Ray Ashdown she threw the lemon juice
out the back door and washed the cup?
"A. I asked her when she washed the cup.
"Q.

And what was the answer?
"A. I asked her. She said 'I washed the cup
after I had made the second telephone call.' I said
to her, I said 'Well, that sounds pretty funny, Mrs.
Ashdown, that you would stop and wash a cup while
your husband was taking convulsions.' I says 'Can
you tell us the reason for that?' She says, 'No, I
can't.' A little later on she says 'I guess I was
excited' " (R. 75, 76).
"Q.

On the 27th day of July, 1955, at the defendant's
arraignment, when entering her plea of not guilty, the
defendant said :
"I am not guilty, not guilty. I didn't mean to
do it" (R. 102).
The court ruled this last statement inadmissible as evidence
against the defendant and the statement was not offered
as evidence in the presence of the jury (R. 154).
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POINT II
THERE WAS NO COERCION, DURESS OR
PROMISE OF IMMUNITY MADE TO THE
DEFENDANT NOR WAS THERE A VIOLATION OF ANY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF
THE DEFENDANT AND THE COURT WAS
CORRECT IN SO FINDING.
The trial of this cause commenced at 10:00 o'clock a.m.,
on August 22, 1955; the selection of a jury was completed
and court recessed at 5 :00 p. m. of said day. At 10 :00
a.m. of the following day, August 23, 1955, the actual trial
commenced (R. 1, 2, 3).
The State called the witness Martha Turnbaugh who
testified that she was acquainted with the deceased, Ray
Ashdown, and that she saw him alive in his back dooryard
on July 5th, 1955 (R. 4, 5, 6).
The second witness for the State was one Mrs. Pat
Sorenson, a neighbor of the Ashdowns. This witness testified (1) as to the defendant's having used the telephone at
the home of the witness on the morning of July 5th, 1955
and of circumstances connected therewith ; ( 2) as to a visit
to the Ashdown home on the afternoon of that July 5th,
to give condolences; (3) as to what this witness observed
pertaining to the physical appearance of the defendant on
these occasions (R. 6 to 13).
Next, the State called one Gloria Jean Barnhurst, another neighbor of the Ashdowns. The witness testified
generally: ( 1) That she saw the defendant in the morning
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of July 5th, 1955; (2) that the defendant used the witness's
telephone to call a doctor ; ( 3) that the defendant returned
to the home of the witness almost immediately after having
left from the first visit; ( 4) that the defendant was real
upset; ( 5) that the witness and the defendant commenced
certain preparation to take the defendant's husband to the
hospital but that before they could do so, the doctor arrived;
(6) that the defendant said her husband had not felt well
since his breakfast; that he was in a lot of pain and was
going paralyzed from his waist down (R. 13 to 20).
Dr. R. G. Williams was the next witness called by the
State. The doctor testified as to his attendance of the de\oo
ceased at the home of the deceased and the defendant on
the morning of July 5th, 1955, and as to the death of the
deceased thereat; as to arranging for a coroner's jury; as
to the performance of an autopsy on the body of the deceased; as to the preparation of specimens for examination
by the State Chemist; and, on cross-examination, as to
some of the things defendant said to him during his attending the deceased and as to the physical and mental state
of the defendant at such time. The doctor was interrogated
as to his diagnosis of strychnine poisoning as the cause
of death; and, as to other toxins which also affect the
central nervous system ( R. 20 to 36) .
Arch Benson, Deputy Sheriff of Iron County, then
related the method and means by which the specimens
taken from the body of the deceased by Dr. Williams. were
delivered to the State Chemist at Salt Lake City for analysis
(R. 37, 38, 39).
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The State Chemist, M. Elmer Christensen, then testified for the State concerning the results of his findings
from an examination of the said specimens; that the contents of the stomach of the deceased contained strychnine
(R. 37 to 59).
Deputy Sheriff Arch Benson on re-direct examination
related the return of the specimens with the report of the
State Chemist to Cedar City (R. 59, 60).
Dr. R. G. Williams was recalled to identify the State's
Exhibits 1 and 2 which were later admitted without objection by the defense (R. 60, 61, 62 and 187). On cross. .examination, the doctor was further interrogated as to the
autopsy findings and as to the presence of alcohol in the
stomach of the deceased (R. 62, 63, 64).
The State then called Sheriff Arthur Nelson as a witness (R. 65). The sheriff testified as to his activities on
the day of the murder and in connection therewith; i. e.,
July 5, 1955 (R. 65 to 68). Then the Record shows the
following as having taken place:
Now, Mr. Nelson, I call your attention to
the afternoon of the 5th of July 1955, did you
have occasion to return to the Ashdown home?
"A. Well, we went up to the Ashdown home.
"Q.

Who do you mean? Who was with you?
"A. Myself and Arch Benson, deputy sheriff,
Charles Wells, Deputy Sheriff, and A. M. Marsden,
county attorney.
"Q.

When you got to the Ashdown home, what
did you do?
"A. Well, there was Mrs. Ashdown was"Q.
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"Q. Mrs. Ashdown?
"A. Mrs. Ashdown was out in the back of the
house. We drove up to the yard and got out of the
automobile and shook hands with Mrs. Ashdown,
and talked to her a second or two and then I asked
her if she would mind getting in the car, that we
would like to talk to her.
"Q.
"A.

And what happened?
And she did get in the car with us.

"Q. Who was present if you recall at this
time?
"A. The same group, A. M. Marsden, Wells,
Benson, and myself.
"Q.
"A.

And Mrs. Ashdown?
And Mrs. Ashdown.

"Q. Will you tell us if you can who spoke and
what was said, as nearly as you can remember?
"A. As near as I remember I started the conversation. I think I said to Mrs. Ashdown that we
would like to talk to her a little about the case, and
I asked her if she knew really what happened. She
said no she didn't know what had happened. I said
to her, 'WeU, Mrs. Ashdown, Dr. Williams seems to
think that Ray has been poisoned or had some poison.' 'Well,' she says, 'I didn't do it. I wouldn't
even poison a rat.'

"MR. ERICKSON: Just a minute, your Honor.
"THE COURT: We will take a short recess.
"(3 :15 p. m. Jurors admonished by the Court.
Recess)" (R. 68 and 69).
Thereafter at 3:55 p. m., the court re-convened in the ab-

sence of the jury.
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Without the presence of the jury, the following witnesses were examined before the court.
[For the State]
Arthur Nelson, Sheriff (R. 69-100).
Charles Wells, Deputy Sheriff (R. 100-102).
[For the Defendant]
John Walter Segler (R. 103-111).
Milda Hopkins Ashdown, Defendant (R. 111113).
William Henry Hopkins (R. 113-116).
Objections were then made to the admission of the written
confession of the defendant (R. 118, 119). The court took
the matter under advisement and recessed, 5 :45 p. m., until
August 24th, 1955.
August 24th, 1955, at 10:00 a. m., the Court re-convened in the absence of the jury.
The State called as witness:
Charles Wells, Deputy Sheriff (R. 120-140).
The Court called as witness:
Patrick H. Fenton, District Attorney (R. 143148).
Thereafter the court recessed at 11:45 a. m., August 24th,
1955.
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The court re-convened at 2:00 p. m., in the absence of
the jury, and from the testimony taken (R. 69 through
148) made the following statement of its findings:
"THE COURT: Regarding the question of
whether the prosecution can go into the evidence
which has been testified to by the Sheriff Arthur
Nelson and by Deputy Wells and Mr. Fenton, the
court wishes to make the following statement of its
findings:
"First, that there was no promise made or
assurance given of any immunity from prosecution.
"Second, the court finds that the defendant was
advised before the statements that are sought to be
introduced in evidence were made; that she had the
right to refuse to answer questions or make a state·ment and that she had the right to have an attorney.
"Third, that the defendant did not at that time
ask for an attorney, nor until after the statements
offered were made, except as to certain statements
made in answer to questions as to where she procured the strychnine, which questions were asked
and answers made after she indicated that she
should have or desired to have an attorney.
"Fourth, that the defendant was questioned or
interviewed by Sheriff Nelson and Deputy Wells
and the District Attorney from approximately 4 :00
p. m. until approximately 8:30 p. m. before she
made the statements that are under question here;
that she was then in the courtroom in the presence
of those three officers, two peace officers and the
District Attorney, and that her sister, although she
came with her to the sheriff's office, wasn't permitted to go into the room, nor was her father or
her uncle permitted to go into the courtroom during
the course of that questioning.
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"The court finds that there were no threats of
violence or other threats made by either of the officers or by the District Attorney.
"Sixth, that there was no promise made nor
any assurance given of any benefit or reward, except that the District Attorney informed the defendant that if poison had been given by mistake it
might make a difference between a prosecution for
murder and manslaughter, and the District Attorney
read to the defendant the statute relating to first
degree murder and involuntary manslaughter, and
informed the defendant of the penalties for those
respective offenses.
"The court believes that neither the method of
questioning of the defendant under the circumstances
shown by the evidence, nor the physical or mental
distress suffered by the defendant under the circumstances shown by the evidence were severe
enough to amount to compulsion as that is contemplated by the constitutional provisions or statutes
which provide that a person shall not be compelled
to give evidence against himself.
"The court believes that the circumstances were
not such as to induce the defendant to make the
statements in question herein, that is such serious
statements as the statement that she had furnished
or given strychnine to her husband.
"The court believes that the inducing cause of
the statement was not fear nor duress, nor compulsion, nor any promise or assurance of any reward
or immunity. The court concludes that the statements made by the defendant to the officers after
she stated that she desired or should have counsel
are not admissable; that any inquiry as to those
statements should not be made in the presence of
the jury.
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"The court believes that the statements made
to the officers prior to that time are admissible, but
the court proposes to give to the jury an appropriate instruction as to its consideration of the weight
and credibility of such statements. Counsel may
proceed accordingly" (R. 150-152).
Thereafter the record shows, as follows:
"MR. FENTON: Before the jury comes in I
wonder if the court would indicate if the ruling is
intended to cover the acts of the 1Oth of July also,
in which the written confession was solicited.
"THE COURT: Yes. The court believes that
under the conclusion just stated that Exhibit 3
would be admissible in evidence on a proper foundation being laid in the presence of the jury, as was
laid in the absence of the jury before the court.
"MR. MARSDEN : That would be admissible?
"THE COURT: vVill be admissible if a proper
foundation is laid.
"MR. MARSDEN: All right.
"T'HE COURT: In other words, the court does
not believe that the fact that the written confession
was signed while the defendant was incarceratedno, just a minute. No, that would be after she had
requested counsel.
"MR. FENTON: That is correct.
"THE COURT: That that would be inadmissible under the same principle as the other statements, because of having been procured after she
had indicated that she desired to have counsel.
"MR. FENTON: All right, sir.
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"THE COURT: Any statement by the defendant after that would be subject to objection and
the State should carefully refrain from going into
that in the presence of the jury.
"The court requests that counsel use care to
avoid any reference to those things that are excluded
under the present ruling of the court. Anything further before we call the jury?
"MR. FENTON: If I understand correctly
then, your Honor, we are to be permitted in relation
to the 9th, up to the time Mrs. Ashdown asked for
counsel, and at that time be cut off and nothing
after, that anything up to that time is admissible.
"THE COURT: Of course you will have to develop it by laying the proper foundation in your
questioning before the jury.
"MR. FENTON: Yes, your Honor.
"THE COURT: You can't admit it to the jury
without appropriate questioning.
"MR. FENTON : Yes.
"THE COURT: And the court requests that
you avoid leading questions in the presence of the
JUry.

"MR. FENTON: Yes, your Honor.
"THE COURT: One more thing, the court rules
that the testimony of Mr. Wells regarding what the
defendant said at the time of her arraignment before this court is not admissible before the jury and
should not be referred to.
"The court believes that the statement made at
the time the defendant was called upon to enter a
plea should not be admitted as evidence against her.
"You will call the jury" (R. 151-154).
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The finding of the trial court as to the admissibility
of the evidence is fully substantiated by the Record. Mere
excerpts from the Record could not suffice to apprise this
Court of the facts upon which the court below based its
decision; a reading of the record will show substantial
evidence from which that court could reasonably find as
it did.
We have carefully and fully examined the testimony
adduced without the presence of the jury and we can only
conclude that the facts as recorded clearly sustain the findings of the court, in that:

First: There was no promise made or assurance given
the defendant of any immunity from prosecution.
Second: The defendant was advised of her c·onstitutional rights.
Third: There were no threats of violence or other
threats, no promise or assurance given of any benefit or
reward; and
Fourth: Neither the method of questioning nor the
physical or mental distress suffered by the defendant were,
under the circumstances shown by the evidence, severe
enough to constitute the abridgement of any cDnstitutional
guarantee of due process of law.
POINT III
THE DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS TO THE
OFFICERS PRIOR TO HER ARREST AND
PRIOR TO HER REQUEST FOR COUNSEL
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WERE PROPERLY
DENCE.

ADMITTED

IN

EVI-

The Court below refused to admit in evidence the
written confession of the defendant upon the ground that
the defendant had executed the said confession after having made a request for counsel and for no other reason.
The Court found that the defendant's oral confession made
during the interrogation between 4:00p.m. and 8:30p.m.
on July 9th was freely and voluntarily made.
At 2 :25 p. m. on August 24, 1955, the trial resumed
in the presence of the jury. Sheriff Arthur Nelson resumed
the witness stand:
Mr. Nelson, do you remember where you
were with your testimony when the jury was excluded yesterday afternoon?
"A. I believe it was where Mrs. Ashdown had
said that she didn't do it, 'I wouldn't even poison a
rat' " (R. 154).
"Q.

The sheriff then related what had been said about the
deceased's insurance policy; (R. 155) thereafter, the sheriff's testimony concerned the interview had with the defendant on July 9th, in the courtroom, prior to her arrest
and before the defendant asked for counsel (R. 156 to 163).
Twice within the past two years the United States
Supreme Court has re-affirmed its rule of long standing
that courts are not bound to exclude a confession because
it was obtained during unla'vful detention or in the absence
of counsel. Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 476, 73 Sup. Ct.
347, 417; 97 L. Ed. 469, 499 (Feb. 9, 1953) ; Stein v. People
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of the State of New York, 346 U. S. 156, 187, 188; 97 L.
Ed. 1522, 1544; 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1094 (June 15, 1953).
Our Honorable Court has said :

"* * * 'The mere questioning of a suspect
while in the custody of police officers is not prohibited either as a matter of common law or due process', and the mere fact that a confession is made
while the accused is in the custody of the police
officers does not render it inadmissible."

"* * * We have found no case which holds
that a confession is not admissible in evidence
merely because the defendant was immature and
without the advice of counsel, friends or relatives
when it was made and Mares v. Hill, supra, considered this very problem and held that those facts
did not make the confession inadmissible in evidence."

State v. Braasch, et al., 119 Utah 450, 229 P.
2d 289.
Deputy Sheriff Charles Wells was called as a witness
for the State (R. 154) and testified as to the happenings
at the Ashdown residence on July 5th and to the interrogation of the defendant at the Courthouse on July 9th (R.
154 to 172).
Sheriff Nelson was recalled by the defense and questioned as to whether or not the use of a lie detector was
discussed during the questioning of the defendant on July
9th; (R. 183) the sheriff said that the use of the instrument
was not mentioned.
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Deputy Wells was recalled by the defense (R. 184)
and corroborated the testimony of the sheriff as to the lie
detector.
The State rested : The defense rested.
If the ultimate quest in a criminal trial is the truth,
society should not be deprived of the suspect's help in solving a crime merely because he was confined and questioned
when uncounseled. When murders are unwitnessed and
when the only positive knowledge on which a solution can
be based is peculiarly within the possession of the killer,
voluntary and uncoerced confessions, because they are true,
ought not to be excluded for the reason had the defendant
counsel he would have refrained, possibly even against
his will, from making any statement. If this is not true,
then:
"The people of this country must discipline
themselves to seeing their police stand by helplessly
while those suspected of murder prowl about unmolested."
So said the United States Supreme Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Jackson, Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 93 L.
Ed. 1801, 69 Sup. Ct. 1347.
POINT IV
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE GIVING
OF INSTRUCTION NO. 6.
Instruction Number 6:
"In this case there has been testimony that
on two occasions the defendant was questioned or

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
interviewed in the presence of the sheriff and other
officers and that she made certain statements in
answer to questions. Referring to such alleged statements, you are instructed to consider carefully all
the surrounding circumstances including the events
of the day and the experiences of the defendant during the day and days immediately preceding. You
should consider the attitude and conduct of the
officers mentioned, their statements to the defendant, and whether any threats were made or any
promises, either express or implied, of immunity
from prosecution, or whether any assurance was
given of any benefit or reward to the defendant if
she made a statement. You should also consider the
length of time covered by the questioning and
whether the circumstances show any coercion or
compulsion or any physical or mental strain or suffering or fear or hysteria on the part of the defendant during the time. After giving due consideration to all the surrounding circumstances, you should
determine whether the alleged statements were made
by the defendant, and if so, whether such statements
or any of them are entitled to be believed and if so
to what extent. You are the exclusive judges of the
credibility of such statements and the weight to be
given to them if you believe that any such statements were made" (R. 194, 195).
The instruction was proper. The question of whether or
not the statements made by the defendant to the officers
were voluntary was for the court; the credibility of the
statements, as well as the weight to be given them, was
within the exclusive province of the jury. The jurors were
told that they could entirely disregard the statements made
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by the tl~fertdnnt at any time ih the presence of the sheriff
and other officers :

''* * * if you [do hot] believe that any such
statements w·ere made. * * *;,
(Instruction No. 6, supra, [do not] inserted.)
For, this is what the sentence says: "If you believe that.
any such statements were made, you are the exclusive
judges of the credibility of such statements and the weight.
to be given them."
The rule in this State is that the jury cannot determine
the "competency" of a confession. The justices placed that
very limitations upon the decision of Mt. Justice Larson in
the case of State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P. 2d 178,
196. Mr. Justice Wade understood the main opinion in
'State v. Crank, supra, to so hold; Chief Justice Wolfe and
Mr. Justice McDonough concurring. Mr. Justice Wade said:

"* * *

We agree with the rule approved in
those cases, that a confession is not admissible in
evidence unless it was voluntarily made; that this
question must be determined by the court from all
of the evidence from both sides bearing thereon;
that if the court is satisfied from the evidence that.
the confession was voluntary, then the court admits
the confession in evidence to the jury, together with
all of the evidence on the question of whether it was
voluntary, and the circumstances surrounding its
being made, and from such evidence the jury must
determine the weight and credibility to be given it,
but may not determine its competency as evidenc~
that being a question for the court. * * * Utah
cases which hold contrary should be expressly overruled."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
This Court reiterated its rtd~ in State v. Mares, 118 Utah
484, 192 P. 2d 861, 870. In State v. Braasch, et al., supra,
the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Wade, said:
"On the trial the state offered the confessions,
the court excluded the jury and took evidence and
therefrom concluded that they were voluntary and
admissible. The same evidence was submitted to the
jury with the instruction that, if the jury found
that the confessions were ~procured through coercion, threats, duress or any promise of immunity or
benefit' they should be disregarded entirely. Such
instruction is contrary to our holding in State v.
Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P. 2d 178, 170 A. L. R.
542 (concurring opinion at 371 to 375, Utah Reports
and 195 to 197 Pacific Reporter, agreed to by a
majority of the court). There we held that a confession should not be admitted until the court was
convinced that it was made voluntarily which
usually should be determined in the absence of the
jury; that if the court decided it was admissible the
jury should not be required to determine that question again but should hear all the evidence on
whether it was made voluntarily and other evidence
affecting its credibility with instructions to give
the confession such weight as they concluded it was
entitled to but not allo~v them to pass on its admissibility" (229 P. 2d 291). (Emphasis. added.)
Appellant's objection to Instruction No. 6 is without merit;
there is no reason her to distinguish between a written or
an oral confession.
The court below did not err in denying appellant's
motion for acquittal.
The court below did not err in denying appellant's
motion for new trial.
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CONCLUSION
In Stein v. New York, supra, the late Justice Robert
M. Jackson said :
"We are not willing to discredit constitutional
doctrines for protection of the innocent by making
of them mere technical loopholes for the escape of
the guilty * * *. The people of the state are
also entitled to due process of law."
This conviction should be sustained.

Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
WALTER L. BUDGE,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Respondent.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

